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ware developed. The project comprises analysis of WTBs NM 600/44, 600/48, 750/44 and 750/48, all 
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1 Introduction 
Although Danish wind turbines (WTBs) are manufactured to very high standards, a permanent need 
exists for manufacturers to maintain performance records for the turbines they sell. This is no different 
from the situation with other types of quality goods. Such performance records facilitate the undertak-
ing of reliability analyses for the preparation of performance documentation for use by the manufac-
turers’ research and development departments and potential new customers. Reliability analyses can 
also be used to predict the performance of new designs. In order to be able to predict the reliability of 
a system one needs a reliability model and information about component fault frequencies. Failure 
data are usually available in most companies in the form of repair reports. Reliability modelling is a 
well-known tool in other areas and was introduced in the wind turbine industry by the EFP project 
“Safety Systems for Wind Turbines: Method for Evaluation of Failure Modes and Reliability” initiated 
in 1994. This project focussed on WTB Safety Systems, i.e. the systems preventing the turbine from 
going into over-speed under accidental circumstances.  
 A need remained, though, to extend these reliability considerations to the whole wind turbine with 
the additional aim of predicting its availability, i.e. its ability to produce electricity when wind speeds 
are adequate. The need to embrace the whole wind turbine – including the safety system – by a com-
prehensive reliability and availability analysis has necessitated revision and reconstruction of the data-
base and software developed within the framework of the EFP project. 
 The present project comprises analysis of WTBs NM 600/44, 600/48, 750/44 and 750/48, all of 
which have similar safety systems. As these types of WTB differ from those analysed in the EFP pro-
ject, it was necessary to revise the previously developed reliability models and establish new ones. 
 The project resulted in a software package combining a failure database with programs for predicting 
WTB availability and the reliability of all the components and systems, especially the safety system. 
The report consists of a description of the theoretical foundation of the reliability and availability 
analyses and of sections devoted to the development of the WTB reliability models as well as a de-
scription of the features of the database and software developed. Those who are not interested in the 
mathematical details and who focus on the analysis of the results can skip the theoretical part and pro-
ceed with the understanding of how to use the database. 
 The project was carried out by Risø National Laboratory in collaboration with NEG-MICON A/S. 
Funding was provided by the Danish Energy Agency (Project No. 51171/97-0021). 
2 Objectives 
The objective of this project was to develop and establish a database for collecting reliability and reli-
ability-related data, for assessing the reliability of WTB components and subsystems and WTBs as a 
whole, as well as for assessing WTB availability while ranking the contributions at both the compo-
nent and system levels. 
 The reliability analysis supposes development of the necessary reliability models, i.e. event trees and 
fault trees. All the calculations need to be embedded into a software package which together with the 
database is self-sufficient in performing all the analyses laid down in the methodology of the software 
system. 
 Different levels of access and security features need to be provided to exclude non-authorized access 
to the data and the calculation results. 
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3 Theoretical Foundation 
3.1 Definitions 
The most widely accepted definition of reliability is the ability of an item (product, system, etc.) to 
operate under designated operating conditions for a designated period of time or number of cycles [1]. 
This ability can be designated in terms of probability, with reliability being defined as follows [2]: Re-
liability is the probability that a product or a system will perform its intended functions satisfactorily 
(i.e. without failure and within specified performance limits) at a certain time, for a specified length of 
time, operating under specified environmental and usage conditions. 
 Availability analysis is performed to verify that an item has a satisfactory probability of remaining 
operational so that it can achieve its intended objectives. An item’s availability can be considered as a 
combination of its reliability and maintainability. When no maintenance or repair is performed, reli-
ability can be considered as instantaneous availability [1]. The following two definitions can be em-
ployed when defining availability [2]: Availability is the probability that a product or system will op-
erate satisfactorily at any point in time, where the total time considered includes operating time, active 
repair time, administrative time and logistic time. An alternative definition [3] is that: Availability is 
the probability that a system will perform a specified function or mission under given conditions at a 
prescribed time. 
 Maintainability is the probability that a product or system will conform to specified conditions 
within a given period of time when maintenance action is performed according to prescribed proce-
dures and resources. 
3.2 Failure Analysis Approaches 
Systems analysis approaches vary depending on the complexity of the system, the diversity of possible 
failure scenarios, and factors such as reparability/nonreparability, on-demand or permanent operation, 
etc. The following four approaches can be used for failure analysis of WTBs: 
 
1. With systems regarded as simple with nonrepairable components, the manner in which they func-
tion is portrayed by connecting the units in a reliability block diagram [3]. All reliability block 
diagrams are classified as either series, parallel, k-out-of-n or cross-linked structures. These sys-
tems can be in one of two states: either operational or failed. To some extent such reliability dia-
grams can also be employed with repairable systems to assess the probability of failures between 
two down states and mean time between failures, as well as probabilities characterizing random 
time between two failures. 
2. As system repair is generally initiated after a system has failed, a system is either operational or 
under repair. Hence, knowledge of system reliability is of less interest than knowledge of the sys-
tem availability [3]. An availability analysis provides a characterization of system behaviour, ena-
bling some features of maintainability to be modelled. 
3. In multicomponent systems, one can rarely apply approaches 1 and 2, however, primarily because 
the number of components is too great and the interrelationships between the different subsystems 
are less trivial. Fault tree analysis is a method whereby a large number of events that interact to 
produce other events can be related using simple logical relationships (AND, OR, etc.), thereby 
enabling methodical construction of a structure representing the system. 
4. Some systems can require a more comprehensive analysis with the involvement of different exter-
nal conditions such as wind speed, lightning strikes, etc., in which case event tree analysis is the 
appropriate technique for assessing the probabilities of possible outcomes. 
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3.3 Assumptions for Reliability Modelling 
All the systems of a WTB can be classified as either permanently working or working on demand. 
Permanently working systems encompass all systems except the safety system (SS). When undertak-
ing reliability analysis it is convenient to allocate a third category: safety-related systems. Failure of 
safety-related systems affects not only the ability of the WTB to produce electricity but also the per-
formance of the SS. The systems in question are the generator, the driveline and the gearbox. The fail-
ure of any of these systems causes loss of the possibility to bring the WTB to a safe halt. The reliabil-
ity analysis of these three categories has specific features that are examined below. 
 The reliability and availability analyses are two different types of failure analysis, each reflecting a 
different facet of WTB performance. These two analyses are provided based on the data collected in 
the database. 
 The availability analysis takes into account all the failures that affect the WTB’s ability to produce 
electricity due to the time spent on repairing the WTB. It does not allow for the frequency of failures. 
In general, when the average repair cost is a fraction of the initial equipment cost and the latter is high 
and the duration of down time affects the volume of production losses, one is interested in considering 
system repair. In such a system, time between failures, repair time and percentage of operating time in 
an interval are of more interest when analysing system performance. The availability function A(t) is 
defined as the probability that the system is operational at time t. In contrast, the reliability function 
R(t) is the probability that the system has operated over the interval 0 to t. If repair is not permitted, 
then A(t) reduces to system reliability R(t). The reliability analysis thus takes into account the fre-
quency of failure without considering the time spent for recovering the failed components. 
 
In performing these analyses the following assumption is employed: 
 
Failure of any component of a WTB (except the components constituting the safety system) leads to the 
WTB being shut down for repair of the component, during which time the WTB remains idle. 
 
This assumption defines the structure of the reliability block diagram and the fault tree. All the com-
ponents can thus be considered to be connected in series, i.e. the block diagram is a series structure 
and all the events in the fault tree are connected through OR gates (Figures 1 and 2). Thus the WTB 
fails if any of n components fail or if component 1 fails or component 2 fails and so on. 
 
 
 
                                                                         WTB 
 
                                                                                  
 
 
Figure 1. Reliability block diagram of a WTB, 
n is the number of components in the WTB 
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 Figure 2. Fault tree for WTB failure 
 
 
The SS failure analysis is twofold. Firstly, some SS failures affect WTB performance through extend-
ing the repair time. Such failures can be revealed (1) when the SS is activated on demand, or (2) dur-
ing a periodic test control. If there is a failure in the SS and the WTB can be brought to a safe halt the 
repair time spent on recovering the SS simply decreases the availability of the WTB, thus contributing 
to the total unavailability. Such failures are taken into account in the availability analysis. Secondly, 
some SS failures might affect the WTB’s ability to be maintained in a safe mode. Such failures are of 
particular interest and their likelihood must be analysed by means of reliability analysis conducted us-
ing event tree and fault tree analyses. 
3.4 Availability Analysis of Permanently Working Components  
and Systems 
Let Tij represent the (random) length of the jth operating period having mean iTˆ  for the ith component, 
and Dij the (random) length of the jth replacement having mean iDˆ  for the ith component, where 
j=1,2,…; i=1,2,…,n, and n is the number of components in the system under consideration. Figure 3 
illustrates such an alternating sequence of operating and replacement periods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  1 
 
 
 
 
 
                  0 
                             Ti1               Di1                  Ti2              Di2                 Ti3               Time, t 
 
 Figure 3. Alternating failure and repair for component i. 
WTB Fails 
1 2 3 n
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To assess WTB availability the model assumes the following: 
 
(a) The system is in series and a system failure thus coincides with a component failure. 
(b) During replacement of a failed component all other components remain in “suspended animation”. 
When replacement of the failed component is completed, the remaining components abstract op-
eration. At that instant they are not “as good as new”, but only as good as they were when the sys-
tem stopped operating. 
 
As t becomes large, the availability function reaches the following steady-state value [2]: 
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where λi and µi are the mean failure rate and repair rate of the ith component, respectively. 
 It is known (see, for example [2]) – or can be inferred from (1) independently by inserting the as-
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1ˆ , where Ni is the number of failures of the ith com-
ponent during [0,T] – that the average availability of a system in [0,T] is the expected proportion of 
time the system is operating during [0,T], i.e.  
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In the specific case of a WTB, we are also interested in the average availability, A, of WTBs of the 
same type, where A is defined as 
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where NWTB is the total number of WTBs of the same type and opiT  is the total operation time of the 
ith WTB within the interval [0,T]. Equation (3) is only really valid if all NWTB are put into operation at 
the same time 0 and are in operation until the present time. In reality this is not the case, as the various 
starting dates are generally different and some of the WTBs can be put out of operation completely. 
Equation (3) thus has to be rewritten 
 
 ∑
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WTB T
T
N
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 (4) 
 
where iT  is the total calendar time worked by the ith WTB. Equation (4) is used to assess the average 
availability of specific types of WTB. Knowledge of the availability of each type of WTB will enable 
identification of the most unreliable specific WTBs. Availabilities Ai are ranked in order of increasing 
Ai starting from the lowest Ai. A specific WTB occupying the first place is the most unreliable as re-
gards availability. 
 In order to identify the most unreliable subsystems and components it is useful to determine the 
unavailability U represented as 
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where downiT  is the total down time due to failures of the ith WTB within interval [0,T], 
SysN  is the 
number of systems in a WTB of a certain type, downijT  is the total down time due to failures of the jth 
system in the ith WTB. The term ∑
=
WTBN
i i
down
ik
WTB T
T
N 1
1
 was extracted from the average unavailability to 
calculate the contribution to this reliability characteristic made by the kth system. Comparing two sys-
tems k and m, their contributions differ by the terms ∑
=
WTBN
i
down
ikT
1
and ∑
=
WTBN
i
down
imT
1
. When ranking the sys-
tems’ contribution to unavailability it is thus sufficient to rank the terms ∑
=
WTBN
i
down
ikT
1
. Ranking the sys-
tems according to the summary down time will portray the weakest systems with respect to their con-
tribution to the unavailability. 
 Ranking by systems might be not informative enough to show what design improvements would 
have the greatest effect on WTB availability. Identifying the weakest components in a particular type 
of WTB can thus be very useful when trying to identify the most effective improvements. A measure 
of the contribution at a component level can be introduced using the following unavailability represen-
tation, which is similar to equation (5) should be done: 
 
 
where NComp is the number of components in a WTB and downijT  is the total down time due to failures 
of the jth system in ith WTB. Unlike (5) the term ∑
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unavailability in order to be able to calculate the contribution made to the unavailability by the mth 
component. As with the system contribution, it can be inferred that in order to rank the components 
according to their contribution to the unavailability it is sufficient to rank the terms ∑
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Another useful ranking characteristic is that expressing the contribution to the unavailability made by 
the system components, namely: 
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where CompkN  is the number of components in the kth specific system, 
down
ijkT  is the total down time 
caused by the jth component situated in the kth system in the ith WTB. Thus, the coefficient of relative 
component contribution to the unavailability of a system can be calculated as the component’s contri-
bution to the availability divided by the system contribution: 
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3.5 Reliability Analysis of Permanently Working Components 
and Systems 
Reliability assessments are measures of the frequency of failure, but without taking into account repair 
time. They characterize individual properties of components without relating to the performance of the 
system of which they are a part. A usual way of representing reliability is through the failure rates. 
 The general formula for assessing the failure rate of a component is: 
 
 
TN
N
∑=λ  (9) 
 
where N is the number of failures of a component during interval [0,T], and NΣ is the total number of 
components under observation. As regards WTBs, (9) can be rewritten 
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where Nij is the number of failures of the ith component of the jth WTB, Mi is the number of similar 
components in one WTB, and TΣ is the total operational time worked by NWTB WTBs of a given type. 
 The parameter TΣ can be calculated in different ways depending on the nature of the available data. 
If failure data are collected for all wind turbines in operation from the point they entered service, then 
TΣ = ∑
=
WTBN
j
jt
1
, where tj is the total time of operation of the jth wind turbine of a given type. In our case, 
the failure data are collected from a fixed time in the past tPast, which supposes that some failures have 
not been reported and that these unreported periods of time have to be excluded. Moreover, different 
WTB life histories have to be taken into account when calculating the total operational time (see Fig. 
4) expressed as 
 
 ∑ ∑
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where tPast is the date of the first failure reported in the database, NfWTB is the number of wind turbines 
removed from operation within the interval [tPast, tPres], NsWTB is the number of wind turbines entered 
into service within the interval [tPast, tPres]. The remaining variables are explained in Fig. 4. 
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            t1s               t2s         t3s                      t1f   tPast       t4s   t2f    t5s            t4f   tPres    time 
 
Figure 4. Possible wind turbine life history tis – time of initiation of the ith wind turbine operation, tif – 
the cessation of the ith operation, tPast – the time data collection was initiated, tPres – present time 
 
The reliability, Pi(t), of the ith component at time t can be defined as follows: 
 
 tttP iii λλ −≅−= 1)exp()(  
 
When all the components are connected in series, the reliability of the WTB is calculated by the ex-
pression 
 
 ∏ ∏ −==
i i
ii ttPtP )1()()( λ   (12) 
 
There might be some practical difficulty associated with the use of equation (10) due to the fact that 
some of the component failures might not occur within the analysed time interval and because equa-
tion (10) thus gives the failure rate as zero, i.e. the component is ideal from the reliability point of 
view. No component can ever be completely reliable, however, If no failures have been reported for a 
component, the lower reliability can be estimated on the basis of the conservative assumption that a 
failure might possibly take place within the next small time interval, i.e. Nij = 1. Since the upper limit 
is not known for this case one can hypothetically (optimistically) assume that Nij = 0.  
 The lower and upper reliabilities can consequently be determined using equation (12) by employ-
ing optimistic and pessimistic assumptions. 
3.6 Reliability Analysis of Components and Systems Working on 
Demand 
Subsystems and components constituting the SS are not operational all the time but need to be acti-
vated when there is a demand to halt the rotor or to maintain it in a safe mode. The probability that 
they will work on demand, iϖ , is expressed as 
 
 Dem
i
i Λ
=
λ
ϖ  
 
where λi is the failure rate of the ith subsystem or component, ΛDem is the average number of demands 
per year. λi is determined using equation (10). 
In the present case, the number of demands per year is defined as: 
 
Risø-R-1200(EN) 13 
 25line loss >++++= wsGearboxDriveGeneratorGridDemN λλλλλ , 
 
where GearboxDriveGeneratorGrid λλλλ  and , , , line loss  are determined using equation (10), and loss Gridλ  and 
25>wsλ  are the average rates of grid loss and wind speed exceeding 25 m/s, respectively, determined 
from external sources. 
4 Reliability Analysis of the Safety System 
4.1 Basic Concepts of Event Tree Analysis 
Event trees are inductive logic methods for identifying the various possible outcomes of a given initi-
ating event. The initiating event of an event tree is either a system failure or an external event that can 
end in an undesired outcome. The effect of an initiating event on a system depends on what might 
happen next and the sequence of occurrences. As a result, several possible scenarios can be developed 
that could possibly have severe impact on the system and the environment. 
 From a theoretical point of view the probability that a specific system will fail is conditional on the 
initiating events. To analyse a SS, which is activated on demand, we have first to identify all possible 
initiating events. The probability of its failure can then be calculated as 
 
 ∑=
i
ii IPISSPSSP )()/()(  
where SS  designates the failure of the SS and Ii is the ith initiating event. All the initiating events Ii 
together constitute the partitioning of the set of all possible initiating events. This means that 
∑ =
i
iIP 1)( , i.e. all possible initiating events are included in the analysis. Sometimes it is unrealistic 
to consider all the events and instead only those making the greatest contribution to the final probabil-
ity are taken into account. This is usual practice when analysing the reliability and risk of large-scale 
technical systems such as chemical plants or nuclear power plants. 
 Initiating events can be considered under different external conditions (in our case – different wind 
speeds). In this case, we have to calculate the resultant probability conditional on all possible combi-
nations of the initiating events and the conditions IiCj. The final equation for calculating the probabil-
ity that the SS will fail is thus 
 
 )()()/()()/()( j
j i
iji
j i
jiji CPIPCISSPCIPCISSPSSP ∑∑∑∑ ==  (13) 
4.2 Assumptions for the Safety System 
The mission of the SS is different from the rest of a WTB in that it is activated on demand in order to 
bring the WTB to a safe condition, i.e. one in which the rotor is either completely halted or is rotating 
at a permissible rotation speed. SS reliability can thus be defined as: 
 
The reliability of a WTB safety system is the probability that the safety system is able to bring the WTB 
to a safe condition on demand under given conditions for a specified time interval. 
 
As pointed out above, a characteristic of WTBs is that some of the components and systems are per-
manently operational and at the same time affect the performance of the SS. The components in ques-
tion are the generator, the gearbox, and the driveline connecting the gearbox and the generator. When 
the demand arises to stop a WTB the generator connected to the electrical grid acts as an additional SS 
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subsystem and the reliability of the SS thus depends on the reliability of the SS. A failure of the gear-
box affects the reliability of the SS such that rotation of the rotor cannot be halted by the grid con-
nected to the generator and the mechanical brake cannot be engaged. Failure of the driveline disrupts 
the “grid–generator” connection, thereby increasing the probability of SS failure. 
 Six groups of demands activating the SS can be identified: 1) a component failure in the WTB, 2) 
grid loss, 3) generator failure, 4) driveline failure, 5) gearbox failure, and 6) wind speed exceeding 25 
m/sec. These events are assumed to be mutually exclusive, i.e. any two of them cannot happen simul-
taneously. This further implies that while the WTB is being brought to a stop state, the other initiating 
events (demands) cannot take place. This simplification is necessary to simplify the reliability models 
and is practically justifiable. 
 Different weather conditions (wind speed) can require different functionality of the SS, and must 
therefore be taken into account when working out scenarios for possible SS failures. The following 
five wind speed ranges are chosen for the reliability analysis: 1) ws<5 m/s, 2) 5 m/s≤ws<10 m/s, 3) 10 
m/s≤ws<20 m/s, 4) 20 m/s≤ws<25 m/s, and 5) ws≥25 m/s. The lowest range, ws<5 m/s, is of no inter-
est in the present context since a WTB cannot experience over-speed under such conditions. The high-
est range, ws≥25 m/s, is regarded as an initiating event. The following six different scenarios will thus 
be analysed: 
 
 
Initiating event Wind speed Designation 
   
   5 m/s≤ws<10 m/s, C1 I1C1 
Component failure, I1 10 m/s≤ws<20 m/s, C2 I1C2 
 20 m/s≤ws<25 m/s, C3 I1C3 
   
   5 m/s≤ws<10 m/s, C1 I2C1 
Grid loss, I2 10 m/s≤ws<20 m/s, C2 I2C2 
 20 m/s≤ws<25 m/s, C3 I2C3 
   
   5 m/s≤ws<10 m/s, C1 I3C1 
Generator failure, I3 10 m/s≤ws<20 m/s, C2 I3C2 
 20 m/s≤ws<25 m/s, C3 I3C3 
   
   5 m/s≤ws<10 m/s, C1 I4C1 
Drive-line failure, I4 10 m/s≤ws<20 m/s, C2 I4C2 
 20 m/s≤ws<25 m/s, C3 I4C3 
   
   5 m/s≤ws<10 m/s, C1 I5C1 
Gearbox failure, I5 10 m/s≤ws<20 m/s, C2 I5C2 
 20 m/s≤ws<25 m/s, C3 I5C3 
   
ws≥25 m/s, I6  I6 
4.3 Event Tree Construction 
In working out the event trees we were concerned with identifying the sequences ending in SS failure 
states. Sequences that end in success states were therefore generally omitted. Since we are analysing 6 
systems that might affect SS reliability, each of which can have two states (success and failure), the 
total number of states is 26=64. As only a few are failure states there is no need to depict them all. On 
the event trees shown in Appendix I, sequences ending in failure states are shown by bold lines with 
the logical function representation written above them. In this context, “AB” denotes that “the se-
quence takes place if system A is in a success state and system B is in a success state” while “ BA ” 
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denotes that “the sequence takes place if system A is in a success state and system B is in a failure 
state”. On the event trees, the systems involved are denoted as follows: 
 
                A                      B                        C                       D                       E                       F 
Magnetic 
valve 
Pop-out valve 
system 
1 tip brake 
deploys 
2 tip brakes 
deploy 
3 tip brakes 
deploy 
Mechanical 
brake 
 
It should be noted that the event trees for the initiating events “Grid loss”, “Generator failure” and 
“Driveline failure” will be identical because the occurrence of any of these events means that the WTB 
cannot be maintained in a safe mode by the “grid–generator” connection. 
 In conclusion, it is only necessary to develop seven event trees to model the (un)reliability of the 
SS. 
Initiating event “Component failure” 
This initiating event implies that when there is a demand to stop a WTB due to a component failure in 
the WTB, both the generator and the grid are operational. Thus under all wind speeds (except ws≥25 
m/s, which will be considered separately) the WTB will be kept safe by the generator connected to the 
electrical grid. Hence under these circumstances an undesired outcome will not occur and all the three 
conditional probabilities )/( jiCISSP  will be equal to zero.  
Initiating event “Grid loss”/“Generator failure”/“Driveline failure” and wind speed “5 
m/s≤ws<10 m/s” 
To ensure WTB safety under these conditions it must be possible for either one tip brake to deploy or 
the mechanical brake to deploy. 
 The event tree depicting all possible failure scenarios for initiating event “Grid loss” and condition 
“5 m/s≤ws<10 m/s” is shown in Appendix I, Fig. 1. It can be seen that there are 5 different ways to 
reach a failure state. The summarizing logical formula for failure of the SS is thus 
 
 SS /I2C1 = FCAB  OR FCBA  OR FCBA  OR FBA  OR FCBA  
 
which can be simplified as 
 
 SS /I2C1 = FC ( AB  OR BA  OR BA  OR BA ) OR FBA  
 
Furthermore, the expression in parentheses is a certain event that takes place with a probability of 1 
and hence can be omitted. The final canonical expression for failure of the SS is thus 
 
 SS /I2C1 = ) OR ( CBAF  (14) 
 
i.e. “the SS fails if the mechanical brake fails and the magnetic valve fails and the pop-out system 
fails, or one tip brake cannot deploy”. 
Initiating event “Grid loss”/“Generator failure”/“Driveline failure” and wind speed “10 
m/s≤ws<20 m/s” 
To ensure WTB safety under these conditions it must be possible for either one tip brake to deploy and 
the mechanical brake to deploy or for two tip brakes to deploy. 
 The event tree depicting all possible failure scenarios for the initiating event “Grid loss” and wind 
speed “10 m/s≤ws<20 m/s” is shown in Appendix I, Fig. 2. It can be seen that there are 6 different 
ways to reach a failure state. The summarizing logical formula for failure of the SS failure is thus 
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 SS /I2C2 = FDABC  OR CAB  OR FDCBA  OR CBA  OR FDBA  OR AB  
 
with the corresponding final canonical expression being 
 
 SS /I2C2 =    OR   OR  FDC AB  (15) 
 
i.e. “the SS fails if the magnetic valve fails and the pop-out system fails, or one tip brake cannot de-
ploy, or two tip brakes cannot deploy and the mechanical brake fails”. 
Initiating event “Grid loss”/“Generator failure”/“Driveline failure” and wind speed “20 
m/s≤ws<25 m/s” 
To ensure WTB safety under these conditions it must be possible for either two tip brakes to deploy 
and the mechanical brake to deploy or for three tip brakes to deploy. 
 The event tree for this case is shown in Appendix I, Fig. 3. Under these conditions there are 7 pos-
sible undesired outcomes. The final canonical expression for failure of the SS is  
 
 SS /I2C3 =    OR  OR  FED  AB  (16) 
 
i.e. “the SS fails if the magnetic valve fails and the pop-out system fails, or two tip brakes cannot de-
ploy or three tip brakes cannot deploy and the mechanical brake fails”. 
Initiating event “Gearbox failure” and wind speed “5 m/s≤ws<10 m/s” 
To ensure WTB safety under these conditions it is sufficient that one tip brake can deploy. The other 
subsystems of the SS are not available. 
 The event tree for this case is shown in Appendix I, Fig. 4. The final canonical expression for fail-
ure of the SS is  
 
 SS /I5C1 = CAB  OR  (17) 
 
i.e. “the SS fails if the magnetic valve fails and the pop-out system fails, or one tip brake cannot de-
ploy”. 
Initiating event “Gearbox failure” and wind speed “10 m/s≤ws<20 m/s” 
To ensure WTB safety under these conditions it must be possible for two tip brakes to deploy. The 
other subsystems of the SS are not available. 
The event tree for this case is shown in Appendix I, Fig. 5. The final canonical expression for failure 
of the SS is  
 
 SS /I5C2 = DCAB  OR  OR   (18) 
 
i.e. “the SS fails if the magnetic valve fails and the pop-out system fails, or one tip brake cannot de-
ploy or two tip brakes cannot deploy”. 
Initiating event “Gearbox failure” and wind speed “20 m/s≤ws<25 m/s” 
To ensure WTB safety under these conditions it must be possible for three tip brakes to deploy. The 
other subsystems of the SS are not available. 
 The event tree for this case is shown in Appendix I, Fig. 6. The final canonical expression for fail-
ure of the SS is  
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 SS /I5C3 = EDCAB  OR  OR  OR  (19) 
 
i.e. “the SS fails if the magnetic valve fails and the pop-out system fails, or one tip brake cannot de-
ploy, or two tip brakes cannot deploy, or three tips cannot deploy”. 
Initiating event “ws≥25 m/s” 
To ensure WTB safety at wind speeds exceeding 25 m/s it must be possible for three tip brakes to de-
ploy.  
 The event tree developed for this case is given in Appendix I, Fig. 7. The final canonical logical 
expression for the SS failure is  
 
 SS /I4 =    OR  EAB  (20) 
 
i.e. “the SS fails if the magnetic valve fails and the pop-out system fails, or three tip brakes cannot 
deploy”. 
4.4 Aggregated Model for Calculating the Probability of SS Fail-
ure 
The effect of any of three initiating events I2 (Grid loss), I3 (Generator failure), and I4 (Coupling fail-
ure) is similar in the sense that the WTB loses one of the possibilities to be maintained in a safe mode 
by the connection “grid-generator”. The probability of SS failure can thus be expressed as 
 
 )/()/() OR  OR /()( 65432 ISSPISSPIIISSPSSP ++=  (21) 
 
Each term in (21) is calculated on the basis of equations 14–20 as follows 
 
 
)] OR  OR ()() OR  OR ()(                        
) OR ()()][()()([) OR  OR /(
32
1432432
EFDABPCPDFCABPCP
CFABFPCPIPIPIPIIISSP
+
+++=
 
 
)] OR  OR  OR ()(                   
) OR  OR ()() OR ()()[()/(
3
2155
EDCABPCP
DCABPCPCABPCPIPISSP ++=
 
 
 ) OR ()()/( 66 EABPIPISSP =  
 
In order to determine the final expression for calculating the probability that the SS will fail it is nec-
essary to take into account the fact that the intersections of some of the events in the above expressions 
are not empty. The probabilities of those non-empty intersections must appear with a “minus” sign. 
Some of the intersecting events do not appear implicitly, i.e. CDC =∩  (two tip brakes cannot de-
ploy if none can deploy) and DED =∩  (all three tips cannot deploy if two cannot deploy either). 
 The above conditional probabilities can be written as 
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The final expression for calculating the probability that the SS will fail is 
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Probabilities )(  and  ),( ),( EPDPCP  have to be calculated differently from the rest of the probabili-
ties and we have to employ the binomial distribution of probabilities. 
 )(CP is the probability of an event where one tip brake cannot deploy. If we denote one tip brake 
failure by T  and take into account that there are three tip brakes, then  
 
 3)()( TPCP =  
 
D  is an event where two tip brakes cannot deploy. This event takes place if none of the tip brakes can 
deploy or any two out of the three tip brakes cannot deploy. Assuming binomial distribution, 
 
 ))(1()(3)()( 23 TPTPTPDP −+=  
 
E is an event where all three tip brakes cannot deploy together. This event takes place if none of the 
tip brakes can deploy, or any two of the three tip brakes cannot deploy, or all three tip brakes cannot 
deploy simultaneously. Thus, 
 
 223 ))(1)((3))(1()(3)()( TPTPTPTPTPEP −+−+=  
4.5 System Reliability Modelling 
Some of the events in equation (22) are trivial and their probabilities can be defined directly from the 
data collected in the database, or, in the case of wind conditions,  from external sources of informa-
tion. These events or conditions do not need to be broken down and no failure models are required for 
them. The probability of the grid loss, P(I2), and probabilities P(C1), P(C2), and P(C3) thus cannot be 
determined from the data stored in the database, but only from other data, and hence have to be stored 
in the database in the form of constants that can be periodically updated when more precise data be-
come available.  
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Generator failure, P(I3) 
The generator consists of the following components, the failure of each of which will cause generator 
failure: 
 
Bolte 
RPM sensor 
Støddæmper 
Kobling 
Lejer 
Temperatursensor 
Terminaler 
Kabler 
Slanger 
Pumpe 
Vanddækning 
 
From the reliability standpoint, all of the components are connected in series, i.e. the generator fails if 
the “bolte” fails or “RPM sensor” fails or the “støddæmper” fails, etc. The probability of generator 
failure is thus 
 
 P(Generator failure ) = 1 - P(bolte) × P(RPM sensor) × P(støddæmper) ×…, (23) 
 
where all the terms are the probabilities that the individual components are in non-failure state. 
Gearbox failure, P(I5) 
The gearbox consists of the following components, the failure of each of which will cause generator 
failure: 
 
Bolte 
Støddæmper 
Split bushing 
Lejer, pakninger 
Olie 
Suspension 
Temperatursensor 
Oliekøler 
Olievarmer 
Overtryksventil 
Slanger 
Slæbering 
Pumpe 
 
The probability of gearbox failure is thus calculated using an equation similar to equation (23). 
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Mechanical brake failure, P( F ) 
The mechanical brake consists of the following components, the failure of each of which will cause 
generator failure: 
 
Bolte 
Bremseskiver 
Bremseklodser 
Filter 
Hydraulikstation 
Hydraulikslanger 
Ikke-returnventil 
Magnetventil 
Motor 
Microswitch 
Olie 
Overløbssventil 
Trykswitch 
Bremsescoop 
Akkumulator 
 
The probability of mechanical brake failure is thus calculated using an equation similar to equation 
(23). 
Tip brake failure, P(T ) 
A tip brake consists of the following components, the failure of each of which will cause generator 
failure. 
 
Bolte 
Vinge tip guides 
Vinge cylinder 
Vinge tip spring 
Vinge tip 
Vinge root 
Wire 
Surface 
Forkant/bagkant 
Sensor 
Lynbeskyttelse 
Hydraulic system, )( and )( BPAP  
The deployment of the tip brakes is activated by the hydraulic system. To enable the tips brakes to de-
ploy oil must flow through either the magnetic valve (Appendix II, Position 13) or the pop-out system 
(Appendix II, Positions 19 and 55). These are considered independent subsystems of the SS. 
 The magnetic valve is processed in the database as one component and valve failure is designated 
A . 
 The pop-out system is processed in the database as a two-component system that is considered to 
be in a state of failure if the “Sikkerhedsventil pop-out” fails and the “Sprængblik” fails, i.e. the com-
ponents are connected in parallel from the reliability standpoint. This system failure is designated by 
B . 
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5 Conceptual Database Structure and Capabili-
ties 
Now that all the calculations necessary for the availability and reliability analyses have been defined 
and the event and fault trees developed, the database structure and  capabilities can be defined. 
 
The following options are provided by the database: 
 
1. Availability analysis 
 
Assessment of the average availability of a certain type of WTB and ranking of all specific WTBs 
within a certain type sample according to availability. 
 Assessment of the contribution made by system unavailability to the average unavailability of a 
certain type of WTB and ranking the systems according to their contribution to unavailability. 
 Assessment of the contribution made by component unavailability to the average unavailability of a 
certain type of WTB and ranking the components according to their contribution to unavailability. 
 Assessment of the contribution made by component unavailability to the unavailability of the sys-
tem to which the component belongs and ranking of the components according to their contribution to 
system unavailability. 
 Assessment of interannual variation in availability. 
 
2. Information services (data analysis) 
 
Screening, convoluting and reporting information in accordance with user requirements at the 
 
Component level, 
System level, and 
Whole WTB level 
 
3. Reliability analysis 
 
• Reliability assessments of all components and systems and the reporting of them 
• Reliability analysis of the SS subsystems and the SS as a whole 
• Reliability analysis of the safety-related systems 
6 Logical Data Model 
In order to meet the objectives and theoretical requirements, three basic tables (Tables 1-3) and several 
subsidiary tables were created (Appendix III). The basic tables comprise the actual database and con-
tain the basic information needed to make a decision on WTB performance, especially availability and 
reliability. The main reason for dividing the database into a series of tables is to avoid the redundancy 
in the data. The links between tables are provided by Primary and Foreign keys.  
 The table fields contain the option codes in those cases where it has been possible to classify them 
but not full names and definitions. Thus for the fields “System, Component, Failure causes, Detection 
methods, Responsibility, WTB modes” (see Table 1), all the options can be foreseen in advance and 
classified. The codes for these fields are consequently short. The decoding tables for these fields are 
the subsidiary tables. Except for the decoding function, these serve as menu options under data entry.  
 Each type of WTB has its own set of three basic tables and separate entrance, i.e. a separate data-
base. 
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 Tables 2-3 were mainly created to provide for quantitative reliability calculations. The field “Date 
of start” thus contains numbers for t i
s  (2), “Date of finish” for t i
f  (2), and “Test interval” for assess-
ing the (un)availability of periodically inspected components, “Number” for mi (1). The number of 
wind turbines in question, NWTB, is equal to the number of records in the WTB table. 
 
Foreign                       Foreign                     Main Table                                    Table 1 
                   key                              key 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Rec. 
no. 
WTB 
ID 
System Com-
ponent 
Comp 
ID 
Date 
 
kWh Work 
order 
Who 
made 
WTB 
mode 
Repair 
time 
Repair 
man 
1            
            
            
j            
 
 
 
13 14 15 16 17 
Failure 
cause 
Detect. 
method 
Respon-
sibility 
Repair 
action 
Remark 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                             WTB Table                   Table 2 
                                          Primary key  
 1 2 3 
 WTB ID Date of start Date of finish 
record 1    
    
    
record k    
 
 
Component Table                                    Table 3 
                    Primary key  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Component 
 
Component 
name 
System Test  
interval 
Number Price 
 record 1       
       
       
 record n       
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7 Security Features 
The database is secured and access to it requires a user account and a password. The security system 
encompasses both group accounts and user accounts. Each user account must belong to a group ac-
count. There are default user and group accounts and newly created user and group accounts. The fol-
lowing group accounts are relevant for the security of the current database: 
 
Groups: Admins (default) 
 Users (default) 
 NotAdmin 
 Typists 
 
The user accounts are as follows: 
 
Users Member of group 
Admin (default) Users (default) 
Administrator Admins 
Users (default) 
Analyst NotAdmin 
Users (default) 
Typist1 Typists 
Users (default) 
 
The permitted operations within each group account are as follows: 
 
Group Permitted operations 
Not Admin Tables:* 
 Read Design 
 Read Data 
 Queries (all): 
 Read Design 
 Read Data 
 Forms (all): 
 Open/Run 
 Reports (all): 
 Open/Run 
 Macros (all): 
 Open/Run 
 Modules (all): 
 Open/Run 
 Read Design 
Typists Tables (all): 
 Read Design 
 Read Data 
 Insert Data 
 Forms (Components, Form0, 
Form1, Main Table, WTB) 
 Open/Run 
 Macros (all): 
 Open/Run 
 Read Design 
24  Risø-R-1200(EN) 
*Some tables have more permitted operations, which are created and deleted when running the reliability calcu-
lations. These tables are not the objects of the logical model.Only one table “WTB” can be changed by a “No-
tAdmin” group user. These extra permitted operations are necessary to enable insertion of the current data into 
the field “Date of Finish” and to enable calculation of the total working experience. 
 
The “Admin” group is the default group. The “Administrator” group is not listed in the table of per-
mitted operations since all operations are permitted, especially the assignment of new group and user 
accounts and the granting of permitted operations. 
 The security system is organized in such a way that information about groups, users,  registration 
IDs and passwords is saved in the workgroup information file. This file must be used with the database 
in order to be able to gain access to it. The current valid workgroup information file is 
RELIAB.MDW. When it was created, the following information was incorporated: 
 
Name: Wind Turbines 
Organization: NEG MICON 
Workgroup ID: Reliab. 
 
For more about the workgroup information file and the security system see Appendix IV or Help in 
MS Access. 
 The current security settings are listed below. It is necessary to know them in order to be able to 
gain access and change them in the future. 
 Newly created groups and users: 
 
Group: NotAdmin 
Registration ID: 999999 
 
Group: Typists 
Registration ID: 111111 
 
Administrator:  
 Reg. ID: Igor 
 Password: Kozine 
Analyst: 
 Reg. ID: Palle 
 Password: 123456 
Typist1: 
 Reg. ID: Lise 
 Password: 234567 
 
It should be remembered that the passwords and security data are case-sensitive. 
8 User Manual 
The database interface is self-contained in the sense that it is not necessary to use the Access toolbars 
but it is sufficient to use the command buttons on the forms created. The structure of the interface is 
uncomplicated and hence does not need to be described in detail. Some general notes on the options 
provided are given below. 
 The database is divided into two parts: Data Tables and Analyses. 
 “Data Tables” allows viewing, editing and data insertion in the tables “Main Table”, “Compo-
nents” and “WTB”, the contents of which have been described above in Section 5 “Logical Data 
Model”. These tables store all the information used in reliability analyses as well as some reliability-
related data. 
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 The option “Analyses” offers three suboptions: 1) Data Analysis, 2) Availability Analysis, and 3) 
Reliability Analysis. 
 The option structure of “Data Analysis” is as follows: 
 
  Specific WTB 
& Component 
WTB ID Component 
     
  Specific WTB, 
all components 
WTB ID  
 Component    
  All WTBs, all 
components 
  
    
  Specific  
component 
Component  
Data Analysis     
  All WTBs   
 System    
  Specific WTB   
     
  All WTBs   
 WTB    
  Specific WTB   
 
 
The result of any of the options is a report consisting of predefined data selected from the database. 
For example, the result of the option “Data Analysis – System – All WTBs” is a report such as shown 
on the following page. The other options represent similar reports depending on the request. 
 The option structure of “Availability Analysis” is as follows: 
 
 
1 Dynamic 
 
2 All WTBs 
Availability 
Analysis 3 Systems 
 
4 Component 
 
5 System → Component 
 
Option 1 “Dynamic” presents the average availability of the whole sample of WTBs by year, i.e. the 
option provides the possibility to see the interannual variation in availability. 
 Option 2 “All WTBs” provides a summarizing report of the average availability of the type of 
WTB in question and the unavailability of each WTB within the type. The WTBs are ordered by their 
unavailabilities starting with the most unreliable WTB. 
 Options 3, 4, and 5 provide the user with reports showing the contributions to the unavailability of 
3) all the systems, 4) all the components reported in the database, and 5) all the components constitut-
ing a specified system. 
 The option structure of “Reliability Analysis” is as follows: 
 
26  Risø-R-1200(EN) 
  Generator 
   
  Gearbox 
   
  Driveline 
   
  Steering System 
 External Event  
  Nacelle 
Reliability Analysis WTB Reliability  
  Tower 
 SS Reliability  
  Print Board 
   
  Yawing System 
   
  Main Shaft 
   
  Cover 
 
 
The option “External Event” does not perform any calculations and is an information option informing 
the user of the rates of the external events used in the SS reliability calculations. These rates can be 
subject to periodic correction if more precise data become available. 
 The option “WTB Reliability” calculates the reliability of any WTB system excluding the SS. 
Clicking any of the system name buttons will initialize the chain of the resulting reliability assess-
ments of all the components constituting the system and the system as a whole. 
 The option “SS Reliability” calculates the reliability on demand for all the subsystems of the SS 
and the SS as a whole. 
9 Notes for the System Developers 
The relationships between the objects in the database are generally uncomplicated and the developer 
familiar with the basics of MS Access will easily be able to trace most of the actions performed. Nev-
ertheless, there are some chains of related actions that can be difficult to fathom. The most compli-
cated operations are those carried out for the reliability analyses. All the objects involved in these cal-
culations are described below. 
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Option “Reliability Analysis → WTB Reliability → Generator” activates the following sequence of 
actions: 
 
MS Access Object Description 
Macro: Macro Generator Reliability DeleteObject: Table “Tab Gen Failure” 
RunCode: DateOfFinishEqualNow() 
OpenQuery: Query Gen Failure 
RunCode: Generator() 
OpenReport: Report Gen Failure 
RunCode: DateOfFinishOriginal() 
Table: Tab Gen Failure A subsidiary intermediate table deleted and 
recreated prior to each analysis. 
Code: DateOfFinishEqualNow() Inserts into the “WTB” table “Date of Finish” 
field the current date for those WTBs that are 
in operation at the time of the analysis. Action 
is needed for the calculation of the net work-
ing experience (years). 
Make-Table Query: Query Gen Failure Creates the table “Tab Gen Failure” based on 
the table “Components” and the select query 
“Query Gen Comp Failure”. 
Query: Query Gen Comp Failure Selects the generator component failures from 
the “Main Table”. Counts the number of fail-
ures for each of the components. 
Code: Generator() Based on the table “Tab Gen Failure” and the 
query “WTB Total Time”, this code calculates 
the reliabilities of all the generator compo-
nents and the generator as a whole and trans-
fers the results to the table “Tab Gen Failure”. 
Query: WTB Total Time Counts the number of WTBs under observa-
tion and listed in the table “WTB” and the net 
working experience accumulated by all the 
WTBs. 
Report: Report Gen Failure Reports all the calculated reliabilities and 
shows them on the screen. Is based on the ta-
ble “Tab Gen Failure” 
Code: DateOfFinishOriginal() Restores the “WTB” table “Date of Finish” 
field to its original state. The current dates for 
those WTBs that are in operation at the time 
of the analysis.  
 
The listed sequence of the actions is repeated each time the user makes a request and is similar for 
each of the following systems: Generator, Gearbox, Driveline, Steering system, Nacelle, Tower, Print 
board, Yawing system, Main shaft, and Cover. The differences lie in the names of some of the objects, 
which clearly indicate what system they are related to. In the case of the gearbox, for example, the 
names are “Macro Gearbox Reliability”, “Tab Gear failure”, “Query Gear Failure”, “Gearbox()”, and 
“Report Gear Failure”. 
 The reliability calculations for the Safety System and its subsystems are carried out differently. 
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MS Access Object Description 
Macro: Macro SS Rates RunMacro: Macro Brake Reliability 
RunMacro: Macro Magnet Reliability 
RunMacro: Macro Pop-Out Reliability 
RunMacro: Macro Tips Reliability 
RunMacro: Macro Demand Rates 
RunCode: SSRates() 
OpenReport: Report SS Subsystems 
Macro: Macro Brake Reliability DeleteObject: Table “Tab Brake Failure” 
RunCode: DateOfFinishEqualNow() 
OpenQuery: Query Brake Failure 
RunCode: MechanicalBrake() 
RunCode: DateOfFinishOriginal() 
Table: Tab Brake Failure 
 
A subsidiary intermediate table deleted and 
recreated prior to each analysis. 
Code: DateOfFinishEqualNow() 
 
Inserts into the “WTB” table “Date of Finish” 
field the current date for those WTBs that are 
in operation at the time of the analysis. Action 
is needed for the calculation of the net work-
ing experience (years). 
Make-Table Query: Query Brake Failure Creates the table “Tab Brake Failure” based 
on the table “Components” and the select 
query “Query Brake Comp Failure”. 
Query: Query Brake Comp Failure Selects the mechanical brake component fail-
ures from the “Main Table”. Counts the num-
ber of failures for each of the components. 
Code: MechanicalBrake() Based on the table “Tab Brake Failure” and 
the query “WTB Total Time” the code calcu-
lates the failure rates of all the components of 
the mechanical brake and the system as a 
whole and transfers the results to the table 
“Tab Gen Failure”. The results are intermedi-
ate and do not take into account the demand 
rates. 
Code: DateOfFinishOriginal() Restores the “WTB” table “Date of Finish” 
field to its original state. The current dates for 
those WTBs that are in operation at the time 
of the analysis are deleted. 
The macros “Macro Magnet Reliability”, “Macro Pop-Out Reliability”, and “Macro Tips Reli-
ability” are similar in structure to “Macro Brake Reliability”, which is described above. The 
differences lie in the names of the objects, which are related to the names of the subsystems 
and are easily recognisable. 
Macro: Macro Demand Rates 
 
Since the failure of the generator, the gearbox, 
and the driveline are considered initiating events 
for activation of the SS, their failure rates are re-
garded  as demand rates additional to the grid loss 
and wind speed >25 m/s. This macro activates all 
the actions needed to calculate the total demand 
rate. 
DeleteObject: Table “Tab Drive Failure” 
DeleteObject: Table “Tab Gear Failure” 
DeleteObject: Table “Tab Gen Failure” 
RunCode: DateOfFinishEqualNow() 
OpenQuery: Query Drive Failure 
OpenQuery: Query Gear Failure 
OpenQuery: Query Gen Failure 
RunCode: DemandRate() 
RunCode: DateOfFinishOriginal() 
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Table: Tab Drive Failure A subsidiary intermediate table deleted and 
recreated prior to each analysis. 
Tables “Tab Gear Failure” and “Tab Gen Failure” have the same design as “Tab Drive Fail-
ure” and finally will keep the results of the calculations of their failure rates. 
Code: DateOfFinishEqualNow() See above 
Make-Table Query: Query Drive Failure Creates the table “Tab Drive Failure” based on 
the table “Components” and the select query 
“Query Drive Comp Failure”. 
Query: Query Drive Comp Failure Selects the driveline component failures from 
the “Main Table”. Counts the number of fail-
ures for each of the components. 
Queries “Query Gear Failure” and “Query Gen Failure” have the same design as “Query Drive 
Failure”. 
Code: DemandRate() Based on the tables "Tab Gen Failure", "Tab 
Gear Failure", "Tab Drive Failure", and “Ex-
ternal Events” and the query "WTB Total 
Time". Calculates the total demand rate and 
transfers the results to the table “Demand 
Rates”. 
Code: DateOfFinishOriginal() See above 
Code: SSRates() 
 
Based on the tables "Tab Brake Failure", "Tab 
Magnet Failure", "Tab Pop-Out Failure", "Tab 
Tips Failure", “External Events”, "SS Subsys-
tem Reliab" and “Demand Rates”. Calculates 
the reliabilities of the SS subsystems and the 
SS as a whole on demand and transfers the 
results to the table "Tab SS Reliability". 
Report: Report SS Subsystems Reports the results of the SS reliability calcu-
lations based on the table "SS Subsystem Re-
liab". 
 
All the objects in the database are interlinked and any changes in the design will lead to failure of 
some of the connected actions. Only the content of the Tables 1, 2, 3 and those shown in Appendix III 
and the table “External Events” can be changed. The table “External Events” can be periodically up-
dated when more precise data become available. The contents of all the other tables cannot be 
changed. 
 An exception is the table “Components”. The components “Magnetventil”, “Sikkerhedsventil pop-
out” and “Sprængblik” are referred to via their IDs in the queries “Query Magnet Comp Fail”, “Query 
Magnet Failure”, “Query Pop-Out Fail” and “Query Pop-Out Failure”. If due to some reason their ID 
numbers get changed, proper corrections must be done in the queries. 
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APPENDIX I 
Event Trees for Wind Turbine Failure States 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1. Event tree for initiating event “Grid loss” and condition “5 m/s≤ws<10 m/s” 
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 Figure 2. Event tree for initiating event “Grid loss” and condition “10 m/s≤ws<20 m/s” 
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 Figure 3. Event tree for initiating event “Grid loss” and condition “20 m/s≤ws<25 m/s” 
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 Figure 4. Event tree for initiating event “Gearbox failure” and condition “5 m/s≤ws<10 m/s” 
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 Figure 5. Event tree for initiating event “Gearbox failure” and condition “10 m/s≤ws<20 m/s” 
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 Figure 6. Event tree for initiating event “Gearbox failure” and condition “20 m/s≤ws<25 m/s” 
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 Figure 7. Event tree for initiating event “ws≥25 m/s” 
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APPENDIX II 
Diagram of the Hydraulic System 
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Appendix III 
Subsidiary Tables Providing the System and Component 
Codes 
 
 
 
 
42  Risø-R-1200(EN) 
 
 
 
 
Code System 
T Tårn 
S Styring 
P Printkort 
K Krøjesystem 
N Nacelle 
H Hovedaksel 
G Gearkasse 
B Makanisk 
Bremse 
D Driveline 
E Generator 
I Inddækning 
A Nav 
R Rotor 
hydraulik 
V Vinger 
Code Tårn 
T1 Bolte 
T2 Laskeplader 
T3 Snoede kabler 
T4 Kabler 
Code Styring 
S1 Net 
S2 Relækort 
S3 Transformerkort 
S4 TAC-Computer 
S5 WP3000 
S6 WP2060 
S7 Kommunikation 
S8 Nødstop 
S9 Maksimalafbryder 
S10 Relæer/kontaktorer 
S11 Multistik 
S12 Modem 
S13 Lynbeskyttelse 
S14 Brokopling 
S15 Fasebatteri 
S16 E-prom 
S17 Motorværn 
S18 Kontaktor 
S19 Thyristor 
S20 Sikringer 
S21 Program 
Code Printkort 
P1 RC-enhed 
P2 Temperaturmodul 
P3 Transformer 
P4 Triggerkort 
Code Krøjesystem 
K1 Krøjegear 
K2 Bremse 
K3 Lejer, pakninger 
K4 Motor 
K5 Tænder 
K6 Sensor 
K7 Aftasterlade 
K8 Smørenipler 
Code Nacelle 
N1 Bolte 
N2 Vibrationssensor 
N3 Topboks 
N4 Kabler 
N5 Kabeaflastnig 
N6 Multistik 
Code Hovedaksel 
H1 Bolte 
H2 RPM sensor beslag 
H3 Carbon bøsning 
H4 Lejer, pakninger 
H5 RPM sensor 
H6 Slip ring 
H7 Olie/fedt pumpe 
H8 Hovedleje 
H9 Klemmeelement 
H10 Smørenipler 
H11 Kobberbørste 
Code Gearkasse 
G1 Bolte 
G2 Støddæmper 
G3 Split bushing 
G4 Lejer, pakninger 
G5 Olie 
G6 Suspension 
G7 Temperatursensor 
G8 Oliekøler 
G9 Olievarmer 
G10 Overtryksventil 
G11 Slanger 
G12 Slæbering 
G13 Pumpe 
Code Mekanisk bremse 
B1 Bolte 
B2 Bremseskiver 
B3 Bremseklodser 
B4 Filter 
B5 Hydraulikstation 
B6 Hydraulikslanger 
B7 Ikke-returnventil 
B8 Magnetventil 
B9 Motor 
B10 Micro switch 
B11 Olie 
B12 Overløbssventil 
B13 Trykswitch 
B14 Bremsescoop 
B15 Akkumulator 
Code Driveline 
D1 Bolte 
D2 Kardanaksel 
D3 Kobling 
Code Generator 
E1 Bolte 
E2 RPM sensor 
E3 Støddæmper 
E4 Kobling 
E5 Lejer 
E6 Temperatursensor 
E7 Terminaler 
E8 Kabler 
E9 Slanger 
E10 Pumpe 
E11 Vanddækning Code Inddækning 
I1 Luft cirkulation 
I2 Vindfane 
I3 Anemometer 
I4 Temperatursensor 
Code Nav 
A1 Bolte 
Code Rotor Hydraulik 
R1 Bolte 
R2 Filter 
R3 Hydraulikstation 
R4 Hydraulikslanger 
R5 Ikke returnventil 
R6 Magnetventil 
R7 Microswitch 
R8 Olie 
R9 Overløbsventil 
R10 Tryk switch 
R11 Sikkerhedsventil-pop out 
R12 Accumulator 
R13 Sprængblik 
R14 Kabler 
Code Vinger 
V1 Bolte 
V2 Vinge tip guides 
V3 Vinge cylinder 
V4 Vinge tip spring 
V5 Vinge tip 
V6 Vinge root 
V7 Wire 
V8 Surface 
V9 Forkant/bagkant 
V10 Sensor 
V11 Lynbeskyttelse 
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                   Repair Action                                                      Responsibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                    Failure Causes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Detection Method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code Name 
1 Genanvendes 
2 Genstartet via remote 
3 Genstartet i Vindmøllen 
4 Hejsning 
5 Inspiceret 
6 Installeret 
7 Justeret 
8 Påført
9 Påfyldt 
10 Renset 
11 Samling 
12 Spændt 
13 Udført 
14 Udluftet 
15 Udskiftet 
16 Repareret 
Name 
1 Planned maintenance 
2 Operator 
3 Overspeed 
4 Vibration 
5 Inverter temperature 
6 Inverter control 
7 Grid failures 
Code Name 
 1 Konstruktion og udvikling 
 2 Indkøb 
 3 Montage 
 4 Produktion 
 5 Garanti-service 
 6 Service 
Code Name 
A Brandt 
B Defekt 
C Defekt/Lynnedslag 
D Kontrolleret 
E For stor 
F Irret 
G Knækket 
H Justeret 
I Løs 
J Løbskørsel 
K Monteret 
L Rengjort 
M Pitchet 
N Renoveret 
O Revnet 
P Rusten 
Q Sidder fast 
R Slidt 
S Støjer 
T Ude af justering 
U Udført 
V Udtaget 
X Udskiftet 
Y Udluftet 
Z Utæt 
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Appendix IV 
Creating a new Microsoft Access workgroup information 
file 
 
When you install Microsoft Access, the Setup program automatically creates a Microsoft Access 
workgroup information file that is identified by the name and organization information you specify. 
Because this information is often easy to determine, it is possible for unauthorized users to create an-
other version of this workgroup information file and consequently irrevocably assume the permitted 
operations of an administrator account (i.e. an Admins group user) in the workgroup defined by that 
workgroup information file. To prevent this, you should therefore create a new workgroup information 
file and specify a workgroup ID (WID). Thereafter only persons knowing the new WID will be able to 
create a copy of the workgroup information file. 
 
1. Exit Microsoft Access. 
2. To start the “Workgroup Administrator”, do one of the following, depending on which operating 
system you are using: 
 
• If you are using Windows 95, use “My Computer” or “Windows Explorer” to open the “System” 
subfolder in the Windows folder, and then double-click “Wrkgadm.exe”. 
• If you are using Windows NT Workstation 4.0, use “My Computer” or “Windows Explorer” to 
open the “System32” subfolder in the WinNT folder, and then double-click “Wrkgadm.exe”. 
• If you are using Windows NT Workstation 3.51, open “Program Manager”, and then double-click 
the “Workgroup Administrator” icon in the program group where you installed Microsoft Access. 
 
3. In the “Workgroup Administrator” dialogue box, click “Create”, and then type your name and or-
ganization. 
4. In the “Workgroup Owner Information” dialogue box, type any combination of up to 20 numbers 
and letters, and then click “OK”. 
 
Caution: Be sure to write down your exact name, organization, and workgroup ID, carefully distin-
guishing between upper-case and lower-case letters for all three entries and store the information in a 
safe place. If you have to re-create the workgroup information file, you must supply exactly the same 
name, organization, and workgroup ID. If you forget or lose these entries, you cannot recover them 
and might lose access to your databases. 
 
5. Type a new name for the new workgroup information file, and then click “OK”. (By default, the 
workgroup information file is saved in the folder where you installed Microsoft Access. To save in 
a different location, type a new path or click “Browse” to specify the new path). 
 
The new workgroup information file is used the next time you start Microsoft Access. Any user and 
group accounts or passwords you create are saved in the new workgroup information file. To have 
others join the workgroup defined by your new workgroup information file, copy it to a shared folder 
(if you did not already save it in a shared folder in step 4), and then have each user run the “Work-
group Administrator” to join the new workgroup information file. 
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Appendix V 
Glossary of WTB construction and maintenance terms 
 
Aftasteplade  
Akkumulator Accumulator 
Anemometer Anemometer 
Bolte Bolts 
Bremse Brake  
Bremseklodser Brake shoes 
Bremsescoop Brake scoop 
Bremseskive Brake disc 
Brokobling Bridge coupling 
Brændt Burnt 
Carbon bøsning Carbon  bushing 
Kardanaksel Cardan shaft 
Defekt Defective 
Defekt/Lynnedslag Defective/Struck by lightning 
Fasebatteri Phase battery 
Filter Filter 
For stor Too large 
Forkant/bagkant Front edge/back edge 
Garanti-service Warranty service 
Gearkasse Gear box 
Genanvendes To be reused 
Genstartet i vindmøllen Restarted in the wind turbine 
Genstartet via remote Restart via remote 
Hejsning Hoist 
Hovedaksel Main shaft 
Hovedleje Main bearing 
Hydraulikslanger Hydraulic hoses 
Hydraulikstation Hydraulic station 
Ikke-returventil Non return valve 
Inddækning Cover 
Indkøb Purchase dept. 
Inspiceret Inspected 
Installeret Installed 
Irret Corroded 
Justeret Adjusted 
Kabelaflastning Cable relief 
Kabler Cables 
Klemmeelement Clamp 
Knækket Broken 
Kobberbørste Copper brush 
Kobling Coupling 
Kommunikation Communication 
Konstruktion og udvikling Construction and development 
Kontaktor Power relay 
Kontrolleret Controlled 
Krøjegear Yawing gear 
Krøjesystem Yawing system 
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Laskeplader Fish plate 
Lejer Bearings 
Lejer, pakninger Bearing seal 
Luftcirkulation Air circulation 
Lynbeskyttelse Lightning protection 
Løbskkørsel Over-speed 
Løs Loose 
Magnetventil Magnet valve 
Maksimalafbryder Maximum circuit breaker 
Montage Mounting 
Monteret Mounted 
Motorværn Protective motor relay 
Multistik Multipin connector 
Nacelle  
Nav  
Net Mains 
Nødstop Emergency stop 
Olie Oil 
Olie/fedt pumpe Oil/grease pump 
Oliekøler Oil cooler 
Olievarmer Oil heater 
Overløbsventil Overflow valve 
Overtryksventil Pressure valve 
Pitchet Pitched 
Produktion Production 
Pumpe Pump 
Påfyldt Filled 
Påført Placed 
RC-enhed RC unit 
Relæer/kontaktorer Relays/Power relays 
Relækort Relay card  
Rengjort Cleaned 
Renoveret Renovated 
Renset Cleaned 
Repareret Repaired 
Revnet Fracture 
Rotor Hydraulik Rotor hydraulics 
RPM sensor beslag RPM sensor mounting 
Rusten Corroded 
Samling Connection 
Sidder fast Stuck 
Sikkerhedsventil-pop out Safety valve, pop-out 
Sikringer Fuses 
Slanger Hoses 
Slidt Worn out 
Slip ring Slip ring 
Slæbering Slip ring 
Smørenipler Grease nipples 
Snoede kabler Twisted cables 
Sprængblik  
Spændt Tensioned 
Støddæmper Shock absorber 
Støjer Noisy 
Risø-R-1200(EN) 47 
TAC-computer TAC computer 
Temperaturmodul Temperature module 
Temperatursensor Temperature sensor 
Terminaler Terminals 
Topboks Top box 
Transformerkort Transformer card 
Triggerkort Trigger card 
Trykswitch Pressure switch 
Tænder Teeth 
Ude af justering Out of adjustment 
Udført Carried out 
Udluftet Ventilated 
Udskiftet Exchanged 
Udtaget Removed 
Utæt Leaky 
Vanddækning Water cover 
Vibrationssensor Vibration sensor 
Vindfane Wind vane 
Vinge cylinder Wing cylinder 
Vinge root Wing root 
Vinge tip Wing tip 
Vinge tip guides Wing tip guides 
Vinge tip spring Wing tip spring 
Wire Wire 
WP2060 WP2060 
WP3000 WP3000 
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 Figure 1. Event tree for initiating event “Grid loss” and condition “5 m/s≤ws<10 m/s” 
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 Figure 2. Event tree for initiating event “Grid loss” and condition “10 m/s≤ws<20 m/s” 
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 Figure 3. Event tree for initiating event “Grid loss” and condition “20 m/s≤ws<25 m/s” 
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 Figure 4. Event tree for initiating event “Gearbox failure” and condition “5 m/s≤ws<10 m/s” 
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 Figure 5. Event tree for initiating event “Gearbox failure” and condition “10 m/s≤ws<20 m/s” 
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 Figure 6. Event tree for initiating event “Gearbox failure” and condition “20 m/s≤ws<25 m/s” 
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 Figure 7. Event tree for initiating event “ws≥25 m/s” 
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